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Abstract
Within Non-monotonic Reasoning, numerous principles of causal rea-
soning have been proposed. Many of these principles have been viewed as
desirable in formalisms that reason with causality, and have been widely
adopted throughout the literature. We provide a critique of these prin-
ciples, evaluate their suitability for characterising and formulating causal
non-monotonic reasoning, and find that most are unsuitable. Further, we
discuss a new approach to causal non-monotonic reasoning motivated by
how humans typically reason with causality.
1 Introduction
In day-to-day life, we often make conclusions from information that is incomplete
or vague, at no point quantify any vagueness or uncertainty in the information,
and retract or change our conclusions (if necessary) in light of new information.
As an example, consider the following simple scenario: Bruce is a dog, and dogs
usually like to play fetch. From this information, we naturally conclude that Bruce
probably likes to play fetch. Suppose we then add a new sentence to the scenario:
Bruce does not like to play fetch. We retract our previous conclusion, and instead
conclude that Bruce certainly does not like to play fetch. In doing so, we have
reasoned non-monotonically : retracted our earlier conclusion and made a different
conclusion due to new information, without quantifying any uncertainty.
Non-monotonic Reasoning (NMR) is an attempt to formally capture at least
the non-monotonic reasoning capability native to humans. It is an important
area of Artificial Intelligence, in particular of Knowledge Representation, and is
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motivated by the ability to endow intelligent systems with the capability to reason
non-monotonically using no quantification of uncertainty [29].
For some time, understanding cause and effect has been a goal of various sci-
ences. For example: What causes erroneous cell mitosis? What causes atomic
decay? It has also been a goal of philosophy. For example: What causes humans
to think about causality?
Formalising how humans reason with causality is known to be a very difficult
problem [34, 18, 22, 23, 19, 35, 30, 12]. Firstly, we often don’t know the cause of
things with certainty. So we need to permit uncertainty. For example: turning
the key to “ON” causes the car to start. But what if the battery is dead? Or
not connected? Or the starter motor is broken? Secondly, many familiar logical
and mathematical tools cannot be used to correctly represent causality: material
implication, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and others. Hence formalising how
humans reason with causality quickly becomes a non-trivial task.
Researchers within NMR have noticed that humans very often reason non-
monotonically with cause and effect [31, 20, 23, 19, 35]. As an example, consider
the following simple scenario.
Example 1.1
1. Fred is driving recklessly.
2. Reckless driving usually causes accidents.
3. Fred is later found involved in an accident.
We naturally conclude that Fred’s reckless driving likely caused the accident.
Suppose we then add a new sentence to the scenario, as follows.
1. Fred is driving recklessly.
2. Reckless driving usually causes accidents.
3. Fred is later found involved in an accident.
4. Fred was rear-ended while he was stopped at a red light.
We naturally retract our previous conclusion, and instead conclude that the acci-
dent was caused by a rear-end collision (and not by Fred’s reckless driving).
Similarly to how we reasoned non-monotonically about Bruce playing fetch,
in Example 1.1 we reasoned non-monotonically about the cause of the accident.
From this simple example we see that NMR is well suited to the task of formalising
how humans reason with causality in day-to-day life.
Lists of principles or postulates for certain types of reasoning are helpful for
many reasons. As noted in [2], some of those reasons are the following: they provide
characterisations for certain types of reasoning, they facilitate the evaluation of
formalisms that claim to do a certain type of reasoning, they provide guidelines
that formalisms can follow in order to do a certain type of reasoning, and they
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can expose differences (which might not have been previously recognised) between
certain types of reasoning. So lists of principles provide a valuable contribution
to the development of formal reasoning systems. When several lists of postulates
or principles have been proposed for a particular type of reasoning, it is often
very helpful to review those lists and see which principles are commonly agreed
upon. Such principles can often be seen as ideas that characterise a certain type
of reasoning in a general sense.
Our aim in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we present a list of principles of
causal non-monotonic reasoning that have been commonly adopted within Non-
monotonic Reasoning (NMR). In doing so, we also provide a survey of the current
literature on causal non-monotonic reasoning. Secondly, we determine whether
or not these principles sensibly characterise causal non-monotonic reasoning in a
general sense; that is, causal non-monotonic reasoning as displayed by humans in
day-to-day life. Interestingly, the second of our aims presents us with the following
problem. The principles suggested in [38], [3], and [12] are, in each case, stated
only in the context of the logics (or mathematical relations, in the case of [3])
proposed in those papers. This is also the case in [30], but to a lesser degree: in
that paper, some of the principles are stated in the context of propositional logic,
whereas others are context free. The problem arises in that for some of these
context-bound principles, it is difficult to determine their meaning when they are
removed from their particular contexts. For example: some of the axiomatic pos-
tulates proposed in [12] concern how a particular modal operator should be used
and understood in the context of the conditional logic proposed in that paper. So
when it comes to a principle concerning the usage and meaning of a modal oper-
ator in a conditional logic, how are we to understand this principle in a general
sense? Can it be sensibly translated? If so, how?
When deciding which principles or postulates sensibly characterise general
causal non-monotonic reasoning, we would like our decision to be as well-informed
as possible. Hence for any proposed principle that is context-bound, instead of
disregarding that principle, we will try to find the motivation or idea that under-
pins it. If we can, then we will evaluate that motivation or idea for general causal
non-monotonic reasoning. If not, then we will not consider that principle for now.
2 Proposed principles of causal non-monotonic
reasoning
Here we present a list of proposed principles of causal non-monotonic reasoning
that have been commonly adopted within NMR, and evaluate their suitability for
characterising causal non-monotonic reasoning in a general sense. Our viewpoint
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here will be an intuitive one: we wish to review and evaluate the proposed princi-
ples in as general a manner as possible, and hence we will not assume any specific
context or domain of causality. Interestingly, it appears as though most of the
formalisms within NMR that reason with causality have not taken this viewpoint:
rather, each appears to have been motivated firstly by a desire to use familiar
mathematics, and secondly by an interest in dealing with causality only within a
specific domain. We comment further on this in Section 3.
In what follows, we will use the language of classical propositional logic. In
particular, let a, b, c, f, and g be propositional logic formulas, and t be any tautol-
ogy. We will also need to refer to reasoning scenarios that contain knowledge of
the form “f causes g”. We call such knowledge causal information.
2.1 Universal causality
The Principle of Universal Causality states that anything that is true must have
a cause. It has been present in western Philosophy for some time, with its first
appearance arguably occurring in Plato’s Timaeus [6]. Since the time of post-
Aristotelian Philosophy, the principle has been the subject of some debate - a
discussion of notable arguments for and against the idea of universal causality is
given in [21]. Indeed, philosophers have been suspicious of the principle for more
than two-hundred years, with doubts first being cast by Hume in his important
work of 1739 titled A Treatise of Human Nature [14].
Within NMR, there seems to be common agreement that the principle should
be obeyed by formalisms that reason with causality [31, 23, 35, 5, 3, 13, 4, 36].
In many cases, the agreement appears to rest upon the observation that adoption
of the principle allows the use of familiar mathematics - namely a fixed-point
semantics. We show that we do not want to adopt the Principle of Universal
Causality.
Firstly, there exist physical phenomena for which a cause is unknown, and
seems impossible to determine. One such example is radioactive decay. The cause
of radioactive decay is known - an unstable atomic nucleus will emit nucleons or
elementary particles in order to reach the lowest possible energy state. However,
what causes the emission to occur at some particular instant of time is unknown,
and research suggests that the event is entirely stochastic [27, 33, 1]. Secondly,
adopting the Principal of Universal Causality presents the following problems.
Consider any tautology. Regardless of whether or not the tautology has a cause,
it is always true. That is, we do not need a tautology to have a cause in order to
accept its truth. Now consider any entity. If we adopt the Principal of Universal
Causality, then the entity has a cause. Also, the cause of the entity has a cause,
and the cause of the cause of the entity has a cause, and so on until we end up
with a chain of cause and effect. So where does the chain end? Either it has no
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end, and hence is infinitely long, or it is circular. In both cases, it is very difficult
to see how we might make sense of such a chain.
When attempting to formalise causal non-monotonic reasoning, we certainly
would not like to adopt a principle that is defied by an observable physical phe-
nomenon, and which presents problems concerning tautologies and infinite causal
regression. Hence we do not think that the Principle of Universal Causality should
be a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.2 Non-material implication
The Principle of Non-Material Implication states that material implication must
not be used to represent causality. The principle rests on the observation that
material implication cannot always correctly represent causal information, and
hence should not be used to do so. As a simple example, consider the sentence
“If I go to the beach then the weather is fine”. Whilst being a harmless instance
of material implication, my presence at the beach certainly does not cause the
weather to be fine, and hence the sentence makes very little sense if we interpret
it as causal information. More examples are given in [31] and [30], where it is
shown that contrapositivity and conjunctive antecedents are also problematic when
attempting to use material implication to represent causal information. Hence we
agree that the Principle of Non-material Implication should be a principle of causal
non-monotonic reasoning.
2.3 Non-monotonicity
The Principle of Non-monotonicity states that if a formalism claims to reason with
cause and effect, then the formalism must reason non-monotonically. This principle
is motivated by the observation that humans often reason non-monotonically with
cause and effect [31, 20, 19, 23, 35]. This was shown in Example 1.1 above, and
hence we adopt the Principle of Non-monotonicity.
2.4 Context sensitivity
The Principle of Context Sensitivity states that when reasoning with cause and
effect, we do not need to know everything about the scenario at hand. Instead,
we need to know only what is usually, or typically true in that scenario. The
motivation behind this principle is the simple observation that we often make
conclusions about cause and effect based on information that is incomplete or
vague. This was shown in Example 1.1 above, and hence we adopt the Principle
of Context Sensitivity.
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Interestingly, the same observation, but for more general reasoning (not re-
stricted to cause and effect), underpins an active area of research within Philoso-
phy known as “Defeasible Reasoning”. Within NMR, there have been some very
well-known and popular attempts at formalising Defeasible Reasoning, such as
Default Logic [28], Circumscription [24], Autoepistemic Logic [25], and Defeasible
Logic [26]. Indeed, formalising Defeasible Reasoning is one of the underpinning
ideals of NMR. So it appears as though The Principle of Context Sensitivity is
simply another name for Defeasible Reasoning.
2.5 Temporality
The Principle of Temporality states that objects or entities involved in causal
reasoning must have some kind of temporal aspect. That is, the objects or events
should be indescribable without relying on at least a reference to time. It is
proposed in [31], and obeyed by many formalisms within NMR that reason with
causality [8, 31, 19, 23, 35, 13, 36]. These formalisms appear to be motivated by
dealing with causality only in the domain of “actions and change” - a task which
the authors believe is well suited to the adoption of temporality.
Causality occurs naturally in many contexts. In particular, it occurs in con-
texts that do not require temporality in order to be understood. For example: the
sentence “Thoughts of home cause Fred to feel homesick” describes a causal rela-
tionship that does not require the involvement of time in order to be understood.
Whilst temporality may be well suited to reasoning with causality in the domain
of actions and change, we do not want to force domain-specific principles upon all
formalisms that reason non-monotonically with causality. Thus we do not think
that the Principle of Temporality should be a principle of causal non-monotonic
reasoning.
2.6 Irreflexivity
The Principle of Irreflexivity states that when representing and reasoning with
causal information, irreflexivity should hold. That is, we should not have a causes
a. It is proposed in [31], and obeyed by many formalisms within NMR that reason
with causality [31, 20, 9, 10, 5, 12, 3, 4].
Causality naturally brings to mind the idea of what causes what. That is,
we naturally understand the sentence “a causes b” to mean that b is brought
about by the occurrence of a (or that b occurs due to the occurrence of a). To
determine whether or not the Principle of Irreflexivity might be sensibly adopted
when reasoning with causality, we can consider the question “Can something bring
about itself?” An example of such a thing certainly does not spring to mind eas-
ily. Indeed, dismissal of the idea of something causing itself can be found in the
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theoretical foundations of modern philosophy: Immanuel Kant, in his well known
1781 thesis titled A Critique of Pure Reason, strongly refutes the possibility of an
entity causing itself [32]. Surprisingly, some authors in modern Philosophy believe
that this idea is still worthy of debate [37].
We are not comfortable permitting formalisms to reason with causal informa-
tion that is reflexive. Hence we think that the Principle of Irreflexivity should be
a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.7 Antisymmetry
The Principle of Antisymmetry states that when representing and reasoning with
causality, antisymmetry should hold. It is proposed in [31], and motivated by
examples in which symmetry does not make sense. One such example involves the
sentences “Smoking caused John’s death”, and “John’s death caused smoking.”
Clearly the former makes sense, while the latter doesn’t.
Examples like this might appear to be enough to persuade us to adopt the
Principle of Antisymmetry. But there exists examples in which symmetry is not
problematic. Consider the sentence “Smoking cigarettes usually causes a nicotine
addiction”. Applying symmetry here, we get “A nicotine addiction usually causes
smoking”, which makes sense. So there exists examples that support this principle
and examples that oppose it. In deciding which principles to adopt when charac-
terising causal non-monotonic reasoning, we do not want to adopt any principle
which can be shown to be questionable. Hence we do not adopt the Principle of
Antisymmetry.
2.8 Transitivity
The Principle of Transitivity, in simplest form, states that from a chain of sentences
such as “a causes b” and “b causes c”, “a causes c” should follow. It is discussed
in [30], and obeyed by many formalisms within NMR that reason with causality
[20, 23, 38, 5, 3, 4]. We show that we do not want to adopt this principle.
In the NMR literature on reasoning with causality, there are both examples
that support this principle and examples that oppose it [30]. A simple example
that supports transitivity involves a sequence of dominoes: when pushed, the first
domino causes the second domino to fall, which in turn causes the third domino
to fall, and so on until the final domino falls. Here it is reasonable to say that
pushing the first domino causes, via transitivity, the final domino to fall. On
the other hand, an example in which transitivity is not sensible is the following:
thinking about causality causes Fred to become tired, tiredness causes Fred to be
unable to concentrate, and the inability to concentrate causes Fred to be unable to
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think about causality. Applying transitivity, we get that thinking about causality
causes Fred to be unable to think about causality, which does not make sense.
However, here we make an important observation concerning a relationship
between transitivity and temporality. Assuming a temporal displacement between
each of the events in the latter example above, we get the following: thinking
about causality at time t causes Fred to become tired at time t + 1, tiredness at
time t+ 1 causes Fred to be unable to concentrate at time t+ 2, and the inability
to concentrate at time t + 2 causes Fred to be unable to think about causality at
time t + 3. Applying transitivity, we get that thinking about causality at time t
causes Fred to be unable to think about causality at time t+ 3. That is, thinking
about causality at some point in time causes Fred to be unable to think about
causality at a later point in time, which seems sensible.
Importantly, we note that the introduction of temporal displacement to our
example allowed us to use transitivity without reaching a counter-intuitive conclu-
sion. So it appears as though in order to avoid undesirable conclusions when using
transitivity, some kind of temporality is required. Interestingly, this observation
appears to be supported by the fact that many of the formalisms within NMR
that reason with causality and adopt transitivity are also temporal.
We have already shown that we do not want to force temporality on formalisms
that reason non-monotonically with causality. Hence we are not comfortable forc-
ing transitivity upon the same formalisms, since we would then risk those for-
malisms making conclusions that are counter-intuitive. Thus we do not think
that the Principle of Transitivity should be a principle of causal non-monotonic
reasoning.
2.9 Causal conjunction
The Principle of Causal Conjunction states that from “a causes b ” and “a causes
c ”, “a causes b ∧ c ” should follow. It is proposed in [30], and obeyed by many
formalisms within NMR that reason with causality [20, 23, 35, 9, 10, 38, 5, 12, 3,
13, 17, 4, 7, 15, 16].
In each of the formalisms mentioned so far that deal with causality, only causal
information that is certain is represented and reasoned with. That is, the informa-
tion does not contain any inherent uncertainty. But what if our scenario contains
causal information that is inherently uncertain? The following example shows that
this type of information can behave very differently to causal information that is
certain. Consider a switch that causes a light bulb to illuminate in exactly one of
three colours: red, green, or blue. Then for each element in {red, green, blue}, it
is unlikely that the switch will cause the bulb to illuminate in that colour. Also,
if c1 and c2 are different elements of {red, green, blue}, then it is likely that the
switch will cause the bulb to illuminate in c1 or c2.
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Now, it is likely that the switch will cause the lightbulb to illuminate in a
colour that is not red. It is also likely that the switch will cause the lightbulb to
illuminate in a colour that is not green. This information would be enough for
a formalism that obeys the Principle of Causal Conjunction to conclude that a
colour which is not red and not green is likely. However, since the lightbulb must
illuminate in exactly one of the three colours, the likelihood of the switch causing
the lightbulb to illuminate in a colour which is not red and not green is the same
as the likelihood of the switch causing the lightbulb to illuminate in blue. But it is
unlikely that the switch will cause the lightbulb to illuminate in blue. So although
a colour which is not red is likely and a colour which is not green is likely, a colour
which is not red and not green is unlikely.
When asking a formalism to reason with this scenario, we would not want that
formalism making conclusions that are unlikely. Hence we do not think that the
Principle of Causal Conjunction should be a principle of causal non-monotonic
reasoning.
2.10 The “Or” rule
The “Or” rule states that from “a causes c ” and “b causes c ”, “a ∨ b causes c”
should follow. Like the Principle of Causal Conjunction, it is proposed in [30] and
obeyed by many formalisms within NMR that reason with causality [20, 23, 9, 10,
38, 5, 12, 3, 4].
We again show that in scenarios that contain causal information and inherent
uncertainty, the uncertainty can lead to the causal information behaving in an
unexpected manner. We will begin with the 7-lottery example given in [2]. Con-
sider a lottery that contains exactly seven tickets. Let ti be the i’th ticket, and
T7 = {t1, t2, ..., t7} be the set of tickets in the lottery. Now, exactly one ticket in
T7 will be the winning ticket; that is, the outcome of the lottery must satisfy
∨
T7.
Also, since only one ticket can win the lottery, we have for each i and j such that
1 ≤ i < j ≤ 7, the outcome of the lottery must satisfy ¬∧{ti, tj}. Let L7 be the
formula that characterises the 7-lottery. Then L7 is the conjunction of
∨
T7 and
the formulas ¬∧{ti, tj} such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 7.
Suppose that the outcome of the lottery being t5, t6, or t7 causes Fred to
be happy. Consider the formulas f =
∧{L7,¬t1,¬t2}, g = ∧{L7,¬t3,¬t4}, and
h =
∨{t5, t6, t7}. So f restricts the winning ticket to being exactly one of t3, t4,
t5, t6, or t7, while g restricts the winning ticket to being exactly one of t1, t2, t5,
t6, or t7. Now if f is true, then it is likely that the winning ticket will be t5, t6
or t7; that is, it is likely that h will be true. This is also the case for the formula
g: if g is true then it is likely that h will be true. Hence it is reasonable to say
that if f is true then it is likely that Fred will be caused to be happy, and if g is
true then it is likely that Fred will be caused to be happy. This information would
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be enough for a formalism that adopts the “Or” rule to conclude that if f ∨ g is
true, then it is likely that Fred will be caused to be happy. But f ∨ g places no
restriction on the winning ticket, and the winning ticket being t5, t6, or t7 is not
a likely outcome of a 7-lottery. So it is not the case that if f ∨ g is true then h is
likely to be true. Hence it is not correct to say that if f ∨ g is true then it is likely
that Fred will be caused to happy.
When asking a formalism to reason with this scenario, we would not want that
formalism making conclusions that are incorrect. Hence we do not think that the
“Or” rule should be a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.11 Right weakening
The Principle of Right Weakening states that if a causes b and b  c, then “a
causes c ” should follow. Along with the Principle of Causal Conjunction and the
“Or” rule, it is proposed in [30] and obeyed by many formalisms within NMR that
reason with causality [23, 9, 10, 38, 5, 12, 3, 4]. We show that we do not want to
adopt this principle.
When dealing with causality, tautologies, together with the Principle of Right
Weakening, can lead to counter-intuitive results. To see this, let RecklessDriving
and Accident be propositional logic atoms representing reckless driving and a
road accident, respectively. Suppose that in a scenario S, Accident is caused by
RecklessDriving. Suppose also that we adopt the Principle of Right Weakening.
Now since t is a tautology, we have Accident  t. Hence by the Principle of Right
Weakening, we should have that within S, t is also caused by RecklessDriving.
But t can be any tautology. For example, t could represent the sentence “The
grass is green or not green”. Then the Principle of Right Weakening would lead
us to conclude that within S, reckless driving caused the grass to be green or not
green. Clearly, when it comes to reasoning about cause and effect, this conclusion
is not sensible regardless of what scenario is being reasoned with.
When asking a formalism to make conclusions about cause and effect, we would
not want that formalism making conclusions that are not sensible. Hence we do
not adopt the Principle of Right Weakening.
2.12 Left logical equivalence
The Principle of Left Logical Equivalence states that if a causes b and a ≡ c, then
“c causes b” should follow. Along with the Principle of Causal Conjunction, the
“Or” rule, and the Principle of Right Weakening, it is proposed in [30] and obeyed
by many formalisms within NMR that reason with causality [20, 23, 9, 35, 10, 38,
12, 36]. We think it is reasonable to say that logically equivalent causes lead to the
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same effect. Hence we agree that the Principle of Left Logical Equivalence should
be a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.13 Strengthening
The Principle of Strengthening states that if a  b and b causes c, then “a causes
c” should follow. It is proposed in [38] and adopted in [38, 5, 3, 4]. We show that
we do not want to adopt this principle.
It is not difficult to see that this principle leads to counter-intuitive results.
For example, consider the sentences “a causes b”, and “c prevents b”. Then by
strengthening, we may conclude “a ∧ c causes b”. Clearly, this conclusion is not
sensible.
As was the case for the Principle of Right Weakening, when asking a formalism
to make conclusions about cause and effect, we would not want that formalism
making conclusions that are not sensible. Hence we do not think that the Principle
of Strengthening should be a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.14 Cut
The Principle of Cut states that if a causes b and a ∧ b causes c, then “a causes
c ” should follow. It is proposed in [5], and adopted in [5], [3] and [4] (it is also
shown to be a property of the formalism proposed in [38]). We show that we do
not want to adopt this principle.
As was the case for the Principle of Transitivity, in the absence of temporality
the Principle of Cut can lead to counter-intuitive conclusions. To see this, con-
sider the following example: thinking causes Fred to become tired; thinking and
tiredness causes Fred to be unable to think clearly. Applying Cut, we get that
thinking causes Fred to be unable to think clearly, which does not make sense.
However, if we assume a temporal displacement between each of the above
events, we get the following: thinking at time t causes Fred to become tired at
time t + 1; thinking at time t and becoming tired at time t + 1 causes Fred to be
unable to think clearly at time t+ 2. Applying Cut, we get that thinking at time t
causes Fred to be unable to think clearly at time t+ 2. That is, thinking at some
point in time causes Fred to be unable to think clearly at a later point in time,
which seems reasonable.
Importantly, we note that the introduction of temporal displacement to our
example allowed us to use Cut without reaching a counter-intuitive conclusion. So
it appears as though in order to avoid undesirable conclusions when using Cut,
some kind of temporality is required.
We have already shown that we do not want to force temporality on formalisms
that reason non-monotonically with causality. Hence we are not comfortable forc-
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ing Cut upon the same formalisms, since we would then risk those formalisms
making conclusions that are counter-intuitive. Thus we do not adopt the Principle
of Cut.
2.15 Arbitrary conjunction
The Principle of Arbitrary Conjunction states that if a causes b, then for any
propositional logic formula c, “a ∧ c causes b” should follow. It is proposed and
adopted in [38], where it is referred to as “The Law of AND”. It is not difficult
to see that when it comes to reasoning with what causes what, this principle is
not sensible. For example, consider the sentence “An approaching person causes
the door to automatically open”. Suppose we adopt the Principle of Arbitrary
Conjunction. Suppose we then learn that the door’s automatic opening device is
not working. Then the Principle of Arbitrary Conjunction lets us conclude that
an approaching person, together with the fact that the door’s automatic opening
device is not working, causes the door to automatically open. Clearly, when it
comes to reasoning with what causes what, this is not a sensible conclusion. Hence
we do not adopt the Principle of Arbitrary Conjunction.
2.16 Arbitrary causation
The Principle of Arbitrary Causation states that propositional logic tautologies can
be caused by any proposition. It is proposed in [38], and adopted in [38, 12]. It is
not difficult to see that when it comes to reasoning with causality, this principle is
not sensible. For example, let the propositional logic atoms d and g represent the
sentences “Fred is fond of dogs” and “The grass is green”, respectively. Suppose we
adopt the Principle of Arbitrary Causation. Then since g ∨ ¬g is a propositional
logic tautology, we can choose d to be the cause of g ∨ ¬g. That is, we may
conclude that Fred’s fondness of dogs causes the grass to be green or the grass to
be not green. Clearly, such a conclusion is not sensible. Hence we do not adopt
the Principle of Arbitrary Causation.
As was the case for the Principle of Right Weakening and the Principle of
Strengthening, when asking a formalism to make conclusions about cause and
effect, we would not want that formalism making conclusions that are not sensible.
Hence we do not think that the Principle of Arbitrary Causation should be a
principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
2.17 Weakened monotonicity
The Principle of Weakened Monotonicity states that if a causes b, and it is not the
case that a causes ¬c, then “a ∧ c causes b” should follow. It is proposed in [38],
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and adopted in [38, 11, 12]. It is not difficult to see that this principle leads to
counter-intuitive results. For example, let a, b and c represent the sentences “Fred
spends one hour in the sun”, “Fred gets sunburnt”, and “Fred applies a sufficient
amount of sunscreen before spending one hour in the sun”, respectively. Now, it is
reasonable to say that a causes b. It is also reasonable to say that a does not cause
¬c. Then by weakened monotonicity, we may conclude “a ∧ c causes b”; that is,
Fred spending one hour in the sun and applying a sufficient amount of sunscreen
before spending one hour in the sun causes Fred to get sunburnt. Clearly, this
conclusion is not sensible.
As was the case for the Principle of Right Weakening, the Principle of Strength-
ening, and the Principle of Arbitrary Causation, when asking a formalism to make
conclusions about cause and effect, we would not want that formalism making
conclusions that are not sensible. Hence we do not think that the Principle of
Weakened Monotonicity should be a principle of causal non-monotonic reasoning.
3 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed proposed principles of causal non-monotonic rea-
soning that have been commonly adopted within NMR, and evaluated their suit-
ability for characterising causal non-monotonic reasoning in a general sense. Of
those principles, Non-material Implication, Non-monotonicity, Context Sensitiv-
ity, Irreflexivity, and Left Logical Equivalence appear to be suitable. On the
other hand, although Universal Causality, Temporality, Antisymmetry, Transitiv-
ity, Causal Conjunction, the “Or” rule, Right Weakening, Strengthening, Cut,
Arbitrary Conjunction, Arbitrary Causation and Weakened Monotonicity have
been proposed and very often adopted in the literature, we have shown via sim-
ple examples that each is either unnecessary or not suitable for characterising
causal non-monotonic reasoning. In particular: Causal Conjunction, the “Or” rule,
Right Weakening, Strengthening, Arbitrary Conjunction, Arbitrary Causation and
Weakened Monotonicity can each result in formalisms giving counter-intuitive or
incorrect answers to simple reasoning scenarios.
When asking a formalism to reason with causal information, we would not want
the formalism giving counter-intuitive or incorrect answers to simple reasoning
scenarios. One reason for this is that it would make us justifiably suspicious of
the formalism’s ability to reason sensibly with “real world” scenarios, which are
typically much more complicated. It is here that we make an important observation
about the causal non-monotonic formalisms that have been proposed so far in the
literature: it appears as though each has been motivated primarily by the re-use of
familiar mathematics, and less by a desire to formalise the way humans typically
reason about cause and effect. For instance: amongst the formalisms mentioned
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in Section 2, we find the usage of well-known mathematics such as fixed-point
semantics, Circumscription [24], and conditional logics. Unfortunately, each of
the same formalisms adopts at least one of the principles that we have shown
to be either unnecessary or not suitable for characterising causal non-monotonic
reasoning.
The above observation exposes a significant gap in the work that has been
done on formalising causal non-monotonic reasoning within NMR so far. What
is needed is an approach to causal non-monotonic reasoning whose primary moti-
vation is the formal representation of the way in which humans typically reason
with cause and effect. Such an approach would focus firstly on the accurate rep-
resentation of how humans reason with causality in day-to-day life, and secondly
on the selection or construction of suitable mathematics to facilitate formalising
this reasoning. For instance: such an approach could begin with the simple obser-
vation that humans very naturally make conclusions about cause and effect based
on information that is incomplete or vague. Such information contains inherent
uncertainty, which is often not quantified, and is instead represented by the use
of words such as “usually”, “typically”, or “likely”. Future work could then in-
volve the construction of a formalism that correctly captures this reasoning, which
could be guided by the review of proposed principles that we have provided in
this paper. Such a formalism would initiate a new approach to the formalisation
of causal non-monotonic reasoning within NMR: one that is more closely aligned
to the way in which humans reason about cause and effect. In this respect, the
formalism would be a highly valuable contribution to ongoing work in the area.
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